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and made good its advance. This it is which gives it the importance which Mr. Kirkup deems its due.

E. C. K. GONNER.

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DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL. Par E. Durkheim. Paris : Félix Alcan, 1893.

This book, which appears from the title to be a work on political economy or sociology, is in reality a treatise on ethics. To speak more correctly, it seeks, in the economic and social facts summed up under the formula of the division of labor, the verification of a moral thesis. This thesis is as follows :

“Morality is developed in history and under the influence of historic causes ; that is, it has a part to perform in our every-day life. What it is at any given time depends on the conditions then prevalent in society which do not permit it to be otherwise. The proof of this is that morality changes when the conditions change, and only then. If the ancient Romans did not have the broad conception of humanity that we have to-day, this was not due to their narrowness of intelligence, but to the fact that such ideas were incompatible with the nature of a Roman town. Our cosmopolitanism could no more have existed there than a plant can grow in a soil not only incapable of nourishing it, but which is sure to kill it. But, on the other hand, the fact that cosmopolitanism has since made its appearance, is not due to any philosophical discoveries ; it is not because our minds have been opened to truths which we failed to appreciate before ; it is rather because changes have taken place in the structure of society which render necessary a change in our moral notions. Moral ideas, then, are formed, transformed, and maintained by causes of an experimental nature. These are the only causes which the science of ethics undertakes to ascertain.”

It seems clear, then, according to M. Durkheim, that changes in moral ideas are chiefly brought about by the transformations that occur in society as a whole. The author is, indeed, led by a natural progression of ideas to study the solidarity of society, of which he distinguishes two forms : one mechanical, due to the similarity of the elements that compose the social body ; the other organic, due to a division of labor among those elements, which more and more tend to differentiate. The first form is mainly found in ancient times, when society was divided into clans and castes ; the second belongs to our modern society. The study of these two forms brings M. Durkheim to the following conclusions :

“A characteristic of the moral order is that it sets forth the fundamental conditions of social solidarity. Law and morality are the ties which bind us to each other and to society, and which make of the entire mass of individuals an ag-

gregate and coherent whole. In other words, everything which is the source of solidarity, everything that forces a man to take account of others and to regulate his movements by something besides his own selfish impulses, is moral; and morality is all the more vigorous when such ties are strong and numerous. . . . But for all that, we cannot be reconciled to a formula which makes morality a mere function of social interest. Without doubt, society could not exist if its parts were not in some way united. But solidarity is only one of the conditions of its existence. There are others, not less necessary, which are not moral. Moreover, in the net-work of ties which constitutes morality there may be some which are not useful, or which have force without reference to their degree of utility. The idea of utility, therefore, cannot be recognized as an essential element in our definition."

Attention is called to the originality of this conception of ethics, which has no resemblance to the views of Spencer, although it is also based on the inductive method. We can only point out here, in passing, that M. Durkheim's book treats many minor phases of the subject in an ingenious and able manner, as, for instance, in what he says of the relation of justice and charity (p. 129), and of egoism and altruism (p. 214).

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LES LUTTES ENTRE SOCIÉTÉS HUMAINES ET LEURS PHASES SUCCESSIONNELLES. Par J. Novicow. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1893.

This very interesting and very suggestive book, full of facts and ideas, applies the methods of physical and natural science to the study of moral and social questions. From this point of view it appears to be allied to the philosophy of the evolutionists, although it nowhere sets up Spencer as an authority. The conflicts of mankind are considered as a particular instance of a general law which embraces the entire universe. The book might have had for its motto the words of Heraclitus, "*ὁ πόλεμος πάτερ πάντων*." The author tries to prove that conflict is natural, universal, perpetual, and necessary, that it assumes a great number of forms, and that the most ancient and imperfect of these—war, massacre—the progress of humanity tends more and more to eliminate. He distinguishes two kinds of conflict, one slow and irrational (belonging to the past), including homicides, brigandage, slavery, robbery, persecution, intolerance, etc.; the other quick and rational (that of the future), using competition and argument. The book closes with a criticism, often very keen, of the errors of modern politics. The principal objection to be brought against it is that it is too discursive,